Part Nine: 1969 Military Coup in Somalia
Written by Editor Friday, 29 January 2010 11:29
This is the ninth article of a series of articles that Dr. Mohamed-Rashid analyses the military coup and its legacy
1969 Military Coup
By Dr. Mohamed-Rashiid Sh. Hassan
The Regime’s Foreign Policy (Core Countries)
Since independence, Somali foreign policy was mainly built around the question of seeking the unification of all Somali territories under one state. This was the fundamental premise of Somali foreign policy. The military regime made the following six points their foreign policy guidelines:- Support for international solidarity and national liberation movements.
- Oppose and fight all forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism.
- Struggle to maintain Somali National unity.
- Recognise strongly the principle of peaceful coexistence between all peoples.
- Continue the policy of positive neutrality.
- Respect and recognise all international commitments undertaken by this country.
From these six points we can see there was more emphasis on internationalism and closer ties with socialist countries. This was in line with the ideology that the military regime embraced from the beginning.
The Soviet Union
The first two points indicate that the regime's foreign policy was more in tune with Soviet global strategy. The Soviet Union wanted to use Somalia as a proxy state through which it could extend its influence to other parts of Africa, in the same way as it wanted Cuba to extend its influence to Latin American countries. Through Somalia the Soviets supported liberation movements in Africa, such as Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau and South Africa. Somalia was not expected to vote against any proposal put by the Soviet in the UN and in other International Organisations, as was the case in all countries in the Soviet satellite orbit.
The Soviet Union helped to build the Somali army forces. In 1970 The Somali national army became one of the most well trained with the most sophisticated weaponry in black Africa, next to the Egyptian army, also equipped by the Soviets. The Russians were given almost a free hand to use Somali territory for their military purposes, including base facilities in Berbera port, facing the Arab Gulf countries to counterbalance the American military base in Asmara on the Red Sea. East Germans took the responsibility to re-organise the regime’s security Service along the lines of their oppressive security model.
It is fair to mention though, that sometimes the regime made independent decisions even when these were contrary to Soviet foreign policy strategy. For instance while the regime had a closer relationship with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, it also joined the Arab League in 1974, an organisation seen by the Kremlin as reactionary and often used against the Soviet Union’s interest in the Arab and Islamic world. It was unlikely that the Somali government consulted the Soviet Union when this historic decision was made.
Joining the Arab league largely came about as a result of two considerations: First, to ease the pressure coming from conservative Arab countries particularly Saudi Arabia which was not comfortable with the deepening Soviet influence in Somalia.
Second, to pacify the growing concern of the religious leaders in the country who from the beginning did not like the introduction of Marxist ideology into Islamic Somali society.
Even before the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, Czarist Russia saw the Horn of Africa as a strategically important area for their naval power in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Subsequently all Russian governments were keen to maintain good relationship with peoples and governments in the area. Although Soviet ideologists theoretically believed that the military was not the appropriate social organisation or social class to bring about a socialist society, at the same time they realised it was the only social group who had a well established organisational structure in most African countries. Somalia had few industries and hence no working class, or even strong socialist parties, but this did not inhibit Soviet strategists from imposing their Marxist ideology and system of government on the country. Soviet strategists believed the military could be a vehicle for social engineering and a force for transformation and hopefully produce a socialist society along Soviet lines.
The Russians knew perfectly well that Siad Barre was neither revolutionary nor socialist but Somalia was very important for them in the cold war period and this overrode all other considerations. Soviet experts and teachers who worked with Somalis admired Somalis’ relaxed personality, their intelligence and quick understanding of complex scientific theories. Somali students who got scholarships in military and civilian institutions in the Soviet Union were highly regarded for their achievements.
The urban and middle class groups with Western values had an ambivalent attitude towards the Russians. At one level they approved of the support the Soviets were giving to the Somali Armed Forces, since US was helping Ethiopia, the traditional enemy of Somalia. On the other hand they were worried about the deepening influence of socialist countries in their own country. They also regarded the aid and support, which the Soviet Union was providing to the Third World Countries, as cosmetic, and more military - related, rather than as genuine aid motivated for development and economic growth.
The relationship between the two countries was not in fact as harmonious as it appeared on the surface. As a result of the 1977/1978 war, the relationship of the two countries deteriorated. Somalia switched to the West and established a closer relationship with the United States.
The United States of America
The relationship between the military regime and the United States was very low since the regime came into power. One of the first political actions taken by the military was to expel the American Peace Corps. Like other communist countries, the regime constantly watched any Somali who entered the American embassy in the capital and any one who had some relationship with the Americans was seen as anti - revolutionary “kacaan diid”. The card of United States as the imperialist was played to the maximum. All the problems of Somalia were blamed on the West, particularly on the United States. US foreign policy on Somalia was mainly linked to the county’s strategy of containment of Russian and Chinese influence in the Horn of Africa. Since the beginning of the cold war, the Horn of Africa was one of the most strategically contested areas in Africa.
When President Ronald Reagan succeeded President Carter in the White House; American policy took a more offensive approach towards the Soviet Union, and was set to confront the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Latin America and in Africa.
Reagan described the Soviet Union as “an evil empire”. He was the first American President who wanted to take the West/ East confrontation to new levels, which shocked even some of his close policy makers. He wanted to back his statement of "evil empire" with action. CIA cover operations equipped the Mujahidin in Afghanistan through Pakistan, and Contra forces in Latin America were put into operation. Reagan wanted to do the same in Africa too and because of this grand strategy, Somalia became important for the Americans. They asked the Somali regime for military facilities in Berbera port, previously used by the Russians, for its Rapid Development Forces. In a secret meeting, Siad Barre provided the Americans with what they asked for and the US government in return provided Barre’s regime with some economic and military assistance.
The USA also gave the green light to international financial organisations; such as the IMF, the World Bank and Western donor countries to join the bandwagon to support Somalia It was canvassed that Somalia be accepted in the Paris Club. Somalia’s economy was brought more forcefully under IMF structural adjustment programs with their debt reduction and rescheduling schemes, as well as more in line with World Bank directives. Humanitarian Emergency aid for the hundreds of thousands of refugees pouring into the country from Ethiopia as a result of the Somali/Ogaden war was also put in operation.
Even though the regime was accused of more Human Rights violations and did not dismantle its oppressive institutions, it still received American and western economic and political salvage packages. All of sudden Siad Barre was re-incarnated as the good guy and he was invited to Washington to meet President Ronald Reagan. The Arab conservative countries in the Gulf who earlier criticised the regime because of the execution of ten religious scholars in 1975, now welcomed Siad Barre into their midst after the US set the stage for him. "…US military aid to Somalia grew from $20 million in 1980, to $34.1 million in 1985. Yet in 1986 US military aid had dropped to $20.2 million and the following year it fell by more that 50 per cent to $8.2 million. Finally in 1989 it was under I million.
Further explanation on that:
"…There is no doubt that the campaigning of human rights movements such as African Watch and Amnesty International against Barre for his massive violation of human rights at the end of 1980 particularly in Somaliland had a strong influence on the international attitudes towards the dictator.
Britain
British foreign policy in the Horn Africa was always more focused on Kenya. The British colonial administration left British settlers with a huge investment in the country. Kenya achieved its independence from Britain in 1964 and afterwards kept a strong relationship with Britain. Most Kenyan institutions, such as courts and the military were staffed with British experts and advisers.
During the Cold War, Nairobi became the main centre for Western intelligence agencies in east and central Africa to counterbalance Soviet presence in Egypt and Somalia. Next came Ethiopia with whom Britain cemented strong relationships, particularly with Menelik and Haille Selassie. The British presence in Somalia after the Independence was minimal, particularly after 1962 when Somalia cut off diplomatic relations, because of the question of NFD.
This diplomatic relationship was only re-stored in 1967 when Mr. Egal became Prime Minster. But when the military seized power, they closed the British consulate in Hargeisa and nationalised the few British institutions in the country.
The most effective civil servants running the Somali government after independence were mainly British trained Somalilanders. Siad Barre was not comfortable with any British role in Somali affairs. The first and last British parliamentary delegation was led by the former liberal leader David Steel who visited the country in 1972, after first visiting Kenya. David Steel met Siad Barre and raised the importance of democracy and civilian rule and wished peace and prosperity for the Somali people.
Italy
Italy regarded Somalia as their last colony in Africa and always wanted to keep it in its sphere of influence of any cost, regardless of the type of government it might have. The relationship between the two countries during the military regime was good. When the regime had low level of relationship with the rest of the West. Italy enjoyed an even closely relationship with the Somali military regime. After the nationalisation of 1975, some Italian businessmen and their local agents had lucrative business with the nationalised economy. Italian politicians on both the right and left were frequent visitors to Somalia. Italian farmers in the banana business, who mainly originated in Milan, and allegedly had fascist connections in the past were not worried about the rhetoric of regime's socialism. They were enthusiastically welcomed to the dictator's office. At the same time, Italian journalists poured in to the country and portrayed a positive picture of the regime.
Somali studies projects were established in major Italian Universities, such as University of Rome, and Florence and more Somali students were coming all the time to Italy for further studies. The Somali National University in Mogadishu was affiliated to Italian Universities. The Italian/Somali relationship in education was positive step in the right direction. The Somali National University benefited from its connection with Italian Universities. Admission, consultations, professors, syllabuses and examinations were all influenced by this relationship. Somalis were more received in Italy than in any other county during Somali crisis and the Somalis feel at home in Italy because of the colonial link.
WM Weekly
