Part Eight 1969 Military Coup in Somalia
Written by Editor Thursday, 21 January 2010 05:41
This is the eighth article of a series of articles that Dr. Mohamed-Rashid analyses the military coup and its legacy
1969 Military Coup
By Dr. Mohamed-Rashiid Sh. Hassan
As a result of the famine caused by the drought 1974/1975 thousands of people were moved to southern regions and were settled on the banks of the Juba and Shabelle .
Siad Barre took this decision without considering the economic and social implications. There were no feasibility studies and the advice of experts was ignored. On another occasion, Siad Barre criticised those who argued for the importance of feasibility studies before implementation of decisions. The experts were labelled as reactionaries working for the imperialists Isticmar who wanted to make obstacles for the "Revolution".
Soviet military aircrafts were used to move these people, reminiscent of the Stalinist operation when he moved some of the population of central Asia beyond the Urals in the 1930s. Stalin often moved people around without consultation. Siad Barre’s and Stalin’s decisions were influenced by their belief in ideological dogma, which saw this as another path to development and social transformation.
When the people arrived at their destinations they were dispersed into various villages, such as Dujuma, Kurtunwaray and Sablaleh, where some communities involving in traditional farming already lived. The idea was to create state-sponsored collective farms.
The regime wanted to transform these people quickly from nomads into cultivators and farmers. It was a daunting task, and impossible to achieve. A process, which needed proper research and long-time planning, was rushed to produce quick results, typical of a military method of coercive developmental strategies. After years of wasted money, materials and human energy, these schemes failed and the majority of the people returned to their original regions.
Nationalisation: To whom and from whom?
Land reform was followed by nationalisation in two stages. First, mainly the privately owned sector of the economy, banks, insurance companies, pharmaceutical, shipping, electricity companies, as well as the only sugar refinery in the country, at Jowhar, were nationalised. Second, the import and distribution of goods like sugar, rice, oil petrol, and films.
A large part of nationalised businesses was in the hands of Somalis and their associates. The inclusion of the petrol, electricity companies and films had significance; it was based on security considerations. A new government agency ENC (Egenzia Nationale di Commercio) which had total monopoly on the distribution and sale of the main imported food items, such as the rice and sugar was set up. Women had to come in the early mornings to line up in queues to buy basic food items.
The land reform with its crash programme, self-help schemes, control of prices was followed by the establishment of predatory government institutions such as Agricultural Development Agency (ADC) and Egenzia Nationale di Commercio (ENC). These institutions were portrayed by the regime as a towering success of their development strategy. In fact it was a sign of militaristic coercive social engineering in tutelage of Stalinist type, which destroyed communal economic spirit as well as individual creativity. The land reform and nationalisation were twin socialist policies, which were designed to put the economy under the control of the military regime. It was also a clear signal to the Soviets that the military regime was ideologically committed to scientific socialism.
As the leader of the coup, Barre alone had the privilege to appoint people to higher places. Therefore, he appointed new people to run nationalised companies and firms whose administrative skills, knowledge and experience were not up to the job. The majority of them were unqualified and did not understand the difference between a socialist-oriented economy and a capitalist one; the main reason they were chosen was because they were loyal to the leader of the junta. Professional people who were running these institutions previously were described as reactionaries and were dismissed in great numbers.. The terminology reactionary "dib-u socod" came into the Somali political history around 1950. It is derived from an Arabic word rajci, plural ”rajciya”. It was a popular word during 1950 and 1960s when the Arab masses were inspired by the late Egyptian President Nassir political speeches and was imported by the Somali political activists who lived in the Arab countries during that period.
On a number of occasions Siad Barre said in his speeches "dad cusub ayaan abuuraynaa", means “we would create a new people”. In fact he did create what he described as a new people, but who were they and for what purposes? They were his family, clan members and cronies and clients. He put in their hands the economy and the resource of the country, in the name of nationalisation. Equally in the name of nationalisation, decent Somalis whose poor families provided their education and after many years of schooling and hard work got a job in government, were thrown out and were described as anti-revolutionaries Kacaan diid. Hard working business people who with cumulative efforts and through difficult times managed to set up private businesses were robbed and impoverished through this ill fated exercise of nationalisation. One can posit a legitimate question about nationalisation. From whom it was nationalised and to whom it was nationalised for or who benefited from nationalisation? It is obvious that the new “Social Group” largely consisting of Siad Barre's family members and their "clients" benefited from nationalisation. This policy was reversed in 1981 when the Somali government accepted structural adjustment policies of the IMF and World Bank.
WM Weekly
