Part 21: 1969 Military Coup in Somalia
Written by Mohamoud Abdullahi Khalif Sunday, 25 July 2010 02:54
The Twenty-first article of a series of articles Dr. Mohamed-Rashid analyses the 1969 military coup and its legacy
By Dr. Mohamed-Rashid
The formation of the movements
2. The Formation of United Somali Congress (USC)
In the 1980s, a lot of pressure came from all walks of the Hawiye communities both inside and outside the country, that the Hawiye clan must join the struggle against the regime, if they wanted to have any major presence and influence in post-Siad Somalia. As a response of these demands, Hawiye traditional leaders and politicians in the capital held a series of secret meetings. They finally agreed to form a Hawiye political organisation outside the country, financed by the Hawiye business community inside the country. The United Somali Congress was formed in March 1989 in Rome.
It was agreed that the new organisation must open communications with the Somali National Movement (SNM). The Hawiye elders saw the SNM as the only credible fighting organisation. The possibility of joining the SNM or make some alliance with them was high on the agenda. There were some discussions whether this might revive the shorted lived 1967 Isaq/Hawiye alliance. Late Dr Ismail Jum’ale Osobleh, a prominent human rights lawyer was appointed to co-ordinate Hawiye political activities both inside and outside the country. He was authorised officially to contact the SNM. Dr. Jum’ale contacted Ahmed Silanyo, chairman of the SNM in Ethiopia through General Jama Mohamed Qalib in Mogadishu. A united front between the Hawiye and Isaq against the regime was envisaged.
The Hawiye/Isaq alliance of 1980s was reminiscent of 1967. Aware of the failure of the 1967 attempt, there was a lot of hesitation on both sides. The idea is mainly based on “imagined genealogical links” which have little relevance to contemporary geography and the socio-political life of both clans. Hawiye business communities in the capital organised themselves around what became known as the Manifesto Group. They contacted prominent businessmen and traditional leaders from Isaq and other clans. They entertained the idea that a peaceful transfer of power was possible, if they negotiate with the military regime. There was also pressure on the Manifesto Group from the Italian government to pursue a peaceful line. The Italian Ambassador to Somalia was very anxious to salvage the regime peacefully, when he realised how the situation was quickly deteriorating. He was the last foreign Ambassador to leave Mogadishu during the civil war. The Manifesto Group demanded that the President relinquish his responsibility and hand the leadership to somebody else so as to save the country from further destruction and bloodshed.
Hawiye politicians rightly thought that if the armed struggle reached the capital and it was destroyed, the Hawiye would lose more than any other clan. The belief that Siad Barre would resign voluntarily and hand power over was unrealistic to put it mildly. The opposition completely failed to understand the psychology of the dictator. There is rarely a dictator in history that agreed to leave power without a fight. Siad Barre refused all advice to relinquish power and leave. On the contrary, he imprisoned leaders of the Manifesto Group.
Foreign embassies in the capital were following with interest the way the Somali drama was unfolding and preparing for the worst. It became apparent that the regime and the armed opposition groups would have a straight fight in the capital.
The USC wing in Rome was now informed to prepare the organisation for fighting. Dr. Jum’ale made contact with Late General Mohamed Farah Aidid, at the time Somali Ambassador to India, to relinquish his post and organise the fighting wing of the organisation. Two prominent Hawiye politicians Dr. Jum’ale and Ali Wardhigley died of natural causes and this created an unexpected leadership political vacuum for the Hawiye.
General Aidid had his own dreams and plans to become President of Somalia one day. He calculated that this possibility was just around the corner. He spelled out how to translate this dream into reality in a political document later transformed into a book, called "Vision of Somalia". During his stay in India, the General came in contact with followers of an Indian Islamic spiritual Sufi who told him that one day he would be the ruler of Somalia. This further convinced him that he was destined to succeed Siad Barre.
He had already made preparations for this course of action before the message of the Hawiye elders reached him. He contacted the Ethiopian government through their Ambassador to India who was a friend of his and arrived in Ethiopia with a promise for military and political support.
The Hawiye business community and traditional leaders in Mogadishu, however, had strong reservations about General Aidid’s leadership, for three main reasons: First, he was not inclined to agree with others. He was seen as obstinate and uncompromising, therefore undemocratic. Second, he was a military general; and nobody was prepared to replace General Mohamed Siad Barre with another General, even if he was a clan member. Third, there were allegations that he might still be working for the regime, although this was unlikely.
The newly formed USC Committee in Rome contacted General Aidid to come to Rome so that they could together work out a programme for action. He did not go to Rome; instead he arrived in Ethiopia with his own agenda and started discussions with the SNM leaders. The chairman of the SNM, Silanyo advised Aidid not to join the SNM, but instead to open another fighting front in the regions where USC had a strong support. Aidid accepted this suggestion. Silanyo also advised Ahmed Omar Jees to join the newly formed Somali Patriotic Front (SPM) in the Kismayo area and do the same.
General Aidid organised a conference in the village of Mustahil inside Somalia. His strategy in this conference was twofold. Firstly, to overcome the difficulties posed by his internal opponents. Secondly, to emerge as a leader of the USC, both of its civilian and military wings. He succeeded on both cases. The armed struggle in the name of the Hawiye clan whether members of the USC or not came virtually under General Aideed’s authority. He mobilised the military wing very well and after a few months many highly qualified Hawiye military officers deserted the Somali National Army and joined him. There were already about 25 Hawiye officers who deflected the National army and could join Aideed
It was a time in which the Somali National Movement (SNM) political leadership was faced to make hard decisions. Some firmly wanted to concentrate on the North only (now Somaliland) and on the goal of secession. Others were in favour of some kind of alliance with General Aidid who by now was invited to speak in the sixth conference of the Somali National Movement (SNM) in Balegubadle. Aidid reached a tentative agreement with the SNM leadership that his forces and the SNM forces would work closely together and co-ordinate fighting the government forces. The SNM chairman of the time Late Abdirahman Ahmed Ali (Tuur) was indecisive in taking the agenda forward. According to Aideed, the SNM did not provide the co-ordination and the support they promised. Had the SNM leadership and USC of General Aidid indeed worked together on a joint national programme, the situation of the country after the downfall of the military might have been different and the civil war and the bloodshed might have been avoided. There were support and sympathy for Aidid from the SNM supporters and Aidid and his supporters expressed the same for the SNM. Hawiye officers who were still in the Somali Army and working in the North (now Somaliland) secretly co-operated with the SNM forces.
In January 1991 General Aidid's forces arrived at the outskirts of the capital, already in control of several regions. After a few days they finally attacked the presidential palace, Villa Somalia, forcing the Somali dictator to flee on 27 January 1991. Aidid's forces chased him but did not capture the dictator. Siad Barre first fled to Kenya and later to Nigeria where he died in January 1995.
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